论文标题
战略观察学习
Strategic Observational Learning
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在简单的社会学习环境中通过私人知情的前瞻性代理来学习学习。在对称信号结构下，前瞻性剂在任何耐心程度上都近调地行为。近视平衡在对称阈值策略和最简单的对称非单调策略中是独一无二的。如果信号结构是不对称的，并且游戏是无限的，则近视策略在任何积极的耐心方面都没有平衡。
We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric threshold strategies, and the simplest symmetric non-monotonic strategies. If the signal structure is asymmetric and the game is infinite, there is no equilibrium in myopic strategies, for any positive degree of patience.
