论文标题
NFTS的经济学：创作者特许权使用费的价值
Economics of NFTs: The Value of Creator Royalties
论文作者
论文摘要
毫无原则的令牌（NFTS）有望彻底改变内容创建者（例如艺术家）的价格和出售其作品的方式。 NFTS的一个核心功能是嵌入创作者特许权使用费的选项，这些特许权使用费是将未来销售收入的一定比例的收入汇总给创作者的，每次NFTS易手。在实践中，尽管这项功能很受欢迎，但通常会质疑它的效用，因为买家的论点是``在购买时的价格''。听起来很直观，它是不完整的。我们发现特许权使用费至少可以以三种不同的方式为创作者增加价值。 （i）风险共享：当创作者和买家对风险敏感时，特许权使用费可以通过分解与未来价格波动相关的风险来改善贸易； （ii）动态定价：在存在信息不对称的情况下，特许权使用费可以随着时间的推移从更有信息的投机者那里提取更多收入，从而模仿``动态定价''的好处； （iii）价格歧视：当创作者出售多单元NFT收藏时，特许权使用费可以更好地从异质买家那里捕获价值。我们的结果表明，创作者特许权使用费在NFT的经济学中起着重要的，有时甚至被忽视的作用。
Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) promise to revolutionize how content creators (e.g., artists) price and sell their work. One core feature of NFTs is the option to embed creator royalties which earmark a percentage of future sale proceeds to creators, each time their NFTs change hands. As popular as this feature is in practice, its utility is often questioned because buyers, the argument goes, simply ``price it in at the time of purchase''. As intuitive as this argument sounds, it is incomplete. We find royalties can add value to creators in at least three distinct ways. (i) Risk sharing: when creators and buyers are risk sensitive, royalties can improve trade by splitting the risks associated with future price volatility; (ii) Dynamic pricing: in the presence of information asymmetry, royalties can extract more revenues from better-informed speculators over time, mimicking the benefits of ``dynamic pricing''; (iii) Price discrimination: when creators sell multi-unit NFT collections, royalties can better capture value from heterogeneous buyers. Our results suggest creator royalties play an important and sometimes overlooked role in the economics of NFTs.
