论文标题
Buridan桥的真相和虚假
Truth and Falsity in Buridan's Bridge
论文作者
论文摘要
本文重新审视了Buridan的桥梁悖论（Sophismata，第8章，Sophism 17），本身与骗子Paradox紧密相关，其版本也出现在Bradwardine的Insolubilia中。在Cervantes的Don Quixote中发生悖论的提示，我讨论并比较了该问题的四个不同的解决方案，即Bradwardine的“ Just False”概念，Buridan的“偶然性/错误”理论，Cervantes的“ True and and False”，“ True and False”，然后是Jacquette的“ True Simpericiter”，“ True Simpericiter也不是简单的简单词也是如此。所有人共同接受桥梁表达了一个真理的主张，但只有后三个认可真理的透明度。在以前的一些评论中，我首先表明Buridan的解决方案完全符合经典逻辑中悖论的说明。然后，我表明塞万提斯的见解以及雅克的待遇都支持了辩解主义者的帐户，尤其是雅克（Jacquette）对真理的严格说明。我捍卫了辩钉直觉（无论是在LP还是St Guise中）免受两个反对意见：一个关于未来，另一个与骗子相比，另一个涉及桥梁所谓的简单性。
This paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine's Insolubilia. Prompted by the occurrence of the paradox in Cervantes's Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions to the problem, namely Bradwardine's "just false" conception, Buridan's "contingently true/false" theory, Cervantes's "both true and false" view, and then Jacquette's "neither true simpliciter nor false simpliciter" account. All have in common to accept that the Bridge expresses a truth-apt proposition, but only the latter three endorse the transparency of truth. Against some previous commentaries I first show that Buridan's solution is fully compliant with an account of the paradox within classical logic. I then show that Cervantes's insights, as well as Jacquette's treatment, are both supportive of a dialetheist account, and Jacquette's in particular of the strict-tolerant account of truth. I defend dialetheist intuitions (whether in LP or ST guise) against two objections: one concerning the future, the other concerning the alleged simplicity of the Bridge compared to the Liar.
