论文标题
随机数学系统
Stochastic Mathematical Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了一个框架,该框架可用于模拟数学和人类关于数学的推理。该框架涉及{随机数学系统}(SMSS),它们是生成问题和相关答案对的随机过程(没有明确的引用者)。我们使用SMS框架来定义数学推理的规范条件,并定义一对SMS之间的``校准''关系。第一个SMS是人类的推理者,第二个SMS是``Oracle''SMS,可以解释为确定推理者SMS的问答对是否有效。为了进行基础的思考,我们理解了该甲骨文给出的问题的答案是SMS代表整个数学社区的答案,这是在提出和回答问题的过程中无限的长期。然后,我们引入了SMS的略有扩展,以使我们能够对物理宇宙的物理宇宙和人类的推理进行建模。然后,我们定义了适合科学推理情况的略有不同的校准关系。在这种情况下,第一个SMS代表了预测未来实验结果的人类科学家,而第二次SMS代表了科学家嵌入的物理宇宙,其中SMS的问题是SMS的问题,分别是将发生的实验的规范和这些实验的结果。接下来,我们得出了在数学和科学推理中证明两种重要的推论模式合理的条件:i)提高人们对索赔的信念程度的实践,因为人们观察到了越来越多的证据来证明该主张的证据,ii)绑架了绑架的实践,从索赔中推断出索赔的可能性是从其对某些人所掌握的某些索赔方面的解释性权力中正确掌握的可能性。
We introduce a framework that can be used to model both mathematics and human reasoning about mathematics. This framework involves {stochastic mathematical systems} (SMSs), which are stochastic processes that generate pairs of questions and associated answers (with no explicit referents). We use the SMS framework to define normative conditions for mathematical reasoning, by defining a ``calibration'' relation between a pair of SMSs. The first SMS is the human reasoner, and the second is an ``oracle'' SMS that can be interpreted as deciding whether the question-answer pairs of the reasoner SMS are valid. To ground thinking, we understand the answers to questions given by this oracle to be the answers that would be given by an SMS representing the entire mathematical community in the infinite long run of the process of asking and answering questions. We then introduce a slight extension of SMSs to allow us to model both the physical universe and human reasoning about the physical universe. We then define a slightly different calibration relation appropriate for the case of scientific reasoning. In this case the first SMS represents a human scientist predicting the outcome of future experiments, while the second SMS represents the physical universe in which the scientist is embedded, with the question-answer pairs of that SMS being specifications of the experiments that will occur and the outcome of those experiments, respectively. Next we derive conditions justifying two important patterns of inference in both mathematical and scientific reasoning: i) the practice of increasing one's degree of belief in a claim as one observes increasingly many lines of evidence for that claim, and ii) abduction, the practice of inferring a claim's probability of being correct from its explanatory power with respect to some other claim that is already taken to hold for independent reasons.