论文标题
简单而严格的证明方法，用于使用不匹配的基准测量的单量子制度中实用量子密钥分布的安全性
Simple and Rigorous Proof Method for the Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution in the Single-Qubit Regime Using Mismatched Basis Measurements
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）协议旨在允许双方生成一个秘密共享密钥。尽管许多QKD协议在理论上已被证明是无条件安全的，但实验性QKD实现的实际安全分析通常并未考虑到所有可能的漏洞，并且实际上并未为获得紧密且现实的关键率而完全表征。我们提出了一种简单的方法，用于计算离散可变QKD的任何实际实施（也可以适用于无独立的QKD）的任何实际实施，最初是在单Qubit的无损失制度中，并且我们严格地证明其无条件的安全性针对任何可能的攻击。我们希望我们的方法成为用于分析，基准测试和标准化QKD的所有实际实现的标准工具之一。
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols aim at allowing two parties to generate a secret shared key. While many QKD protocols have been proven unconditionally secure in theory, practical security analyses of experimental QKD implementations typically do not take into account all possible loopholes, and practical devices are still not fully characterized for obtaining tight and realistic key rates. We present a simple method of computing secure key rates for any practical implementation of discrete-variable QKD (which can also apply to measurement-device-independent QKD), initially in the single-qubit lossless regime, and we rigorously prove its unconditional security against any possible attack. We hope our method becomes one of the standard tools used for analysing, benchmarking, and standardizing all practical realizations of QKD.
