论文标题
流行协议的错误计算私人集交叉点和联合基数及其更正
Mistakes of A Popular Protocol Calculating Private Set Intersection and Union Cardinality and Its Corrections
论文作者
论文摘要
2012年，de Cristofaro等。提出了计算私有集体交叉点和联合基数（PSI-CA和PSU-CA）的协议。该协议的安全性基于著名的DDH假设。自发布以来，由于其效率（计算和通信中的线性复杂性）和简洁，它已获得了很多知名度。到目前为止，它仍然被认为是最有效的PSI-CA协议之一，也是基于Google Scholar Search所引用最多的PSI-CA论文（超过170次引用）。 但是，当我们尝试实现此协议时，我们无法获得测试数据的正确结果。由于原始论文缺乏实验结果来验证协议的正确性，因此我们更深入地研究了协议，发现这是一个根本的错误。不用说，其正确性分析和安全性证明也是错误的。 在本文中，我们将指出此PSI-CA协议的错误，并提供此协议的正确版本以及该协议开发的PSI协议。我们还提供了新的安全性证明和校正协议的一些实验结果。
In 2012, De Cristofaro et al. proposed a protocol to calculate the Private Set Intersection and Union cardinality(PSI-CA and PSU-CA). This protocol's security is based on the famous DDH assumption. Since its publication, it has gained lots of popularity because of its efficiency(linear complexity in computation and communication) and concision. So far, it's still considered one of the most efficient PSI-CA protocols and the most cited(more than 170 citations) PSI-CA paper based on the Google Scholar search. However, when we tried to implement this protocol, we couldn't get the correct result of the test data. Since the original paper lacks of experimental results to verify the protocol's correctness, we looked deeper into the protocol and found out it made a fundamental mistake. Needless to say, its correctness analysis and security proof are also wrong. In this paper, we will point out this PSI-CA protocol's mistakes, and provide the correct version of this protocol as well as the PSI protocol developed from this protocol. We also present a new security proof and some experimental results of the corrected protocol.
