论文标题
迈向最大提取价值理论I：恒定功能做市商
Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers
论文作者
论文摘要
最大可提取值（MEV）是指矿工（或验证者）从加密货币网络中的用户捕获的过剩价值。这种过剩的价值通常来自重新排序用户的交易以最大化费用或插入前运行用户交易的新事务。 MEV最常见的类型之一是针对恒定功能市场制造商（CFMM）交易的用户进行的“三明治攻击”，这是一类受欢迎的自动化营销商。我们分析了CFMMS中MEV的游戏理论属性，我们称为\ textit {routing}和\ textit {requreding} mev。在路由的情况下，我们提出了示例，其中MEV的存在既降解又违反直觉，\ emph {改善路由的质量。我们在这种环境中构建了无政府状态价格的类似物，并证明，如果三明治攻击的影响是在适当的意义上定位的，那么无政府状态的价格是恒定的。在重新排序的情况下，我们显示了何时由一系列交易的三明治攻击造成的最大价格影响，相对于平均价格，影响是用户交易数量的$ O（\ log log n）$。结合在一起，我们的结果表明了MEV搜索者和CFMM设计师都可以利用MEV估算MEV的成本和利润的方法。
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering users' transactions to maximize fees or from inserting new transactions that front-run users' transactions. One of the most common types of MEV involves a `sandwich attack' against a user trading on a constant function market maker (CFMM), which is a popular class of automated market maker. We analyze game theoretic properties of MEV in CFMMs that we call \textit{routing} and \textit{reordering} MEV. In the case of routing, we present examples where the existence of MEV both degrades and, counterintuitively, \emph{improves} the quality of routing. We construct an analogue of the price of anarchy for this setting and demonstrate that if the impact of a sandwich attack is localized in a suitable sense, then the price of anarchy is constant. In the case of reordering, we show conditions when the maximum price impact caused by the reordering of sandwich attacks in a sequence of trades, relative to the average price, impact is $O(\log n)$ in the number of user trades. Combined, our results suggest methods that both MEV searchers and CFMM designers can utilize for estimating costs and profits of MEV.
