论文标题
您会相信此TLS证书吗？对其中的人的看法（扩展版）
Will You Trust This TLS Certificate? Perceptions of People Working in IT (Extended Version)
论文作者
论文摘要
有缺陷的TLS证书在互联网上并不少见。尽管他们表明了一个潜在的问题，但在大多数情况下，他们都有良性原因（例如，配置错误甚至是故意的部署）。这增加了关于是否信任连接的决定。对于IT专业人员对有缺陷的证书的看法，即使他们的决策会影响大量最终用户，也知之甚少。此外，尚不清楚错误消息和文档的内容对这些看法的影响有多大。为了阐明这些问题，我们观察了75名工业IT会议的参与者，调查了不同的证书验证错误。我们还分析了改写错误消息和重新设计的文档的影响。我们发现，从事它的人们的观点非常细微，信任决定远非二元。自我签名和名称约束的证书似乎被过度信任（后者也很少理解）。我们表明，即使在现有错误消息中进行的小变化也会对资源使用，理解和信任评估产生积极影响。在文章的结尾，我们总结了从与IT专业人员进行可用的安全研究中学到的经验教训。
Flawed TLS certificates are not uncommon on the Internet. While they signal a potential issue, in most cases they have benign causes (e.g., misconfiguration or even deliberate deployment). This adds fuzziness to the decision on whether to trust a connection or not. Little is known about perceptions of flawed certificates by IT professionals, even though their decisions impact high numbers of end users. Moreover, it is unclear how much the content of error messages and documentation influences these perceptions. To shed light on these issues, we observed 75 attendees of an industrial IT conference investigating different certificate validation errors. We also analyzed the influence of reworded error messages and redesigned documentation. We find that people working in IT have very nuanced opinions, with trust decisions being far from binary. The self-signed and the name-constrained certificates seem to be over-trusted (the latter also being poorly understood). We show that even small changes in existing error messages can positively influence resource use, comprehension, and trust assessment. At the end of the article, we summarize lessons learned from conducting usable security studies with IT professionals.
