论文标题
大型拥塞游戏的激励设计：特定于公共性的贝叶斯相关的衣柜平衡（扩展摘要）
Incentive Design for Large Congestion Games: Publicness-Specific Bayes Correlated Wardrop Equilibrium (Extended Abstract)
论文作者
论文摘要
匿名拥堵游戏中玩家（旅行者）的旅行费用取决于他们的路线选择以及运输网络的状态，例如事件，天气和道路工作。在这个扩展的摘要中，我们考虑了一个不完整的信息环境，在这种环境中，国家对旅行者的实现没有观察到。我们研究计划者如何通过战略性地设计旅行者如何了解各州的实现来激励旅行者对她的行为有利。
The travel costs of the players (travelers) in anonymous congestion games depend on their choices of routes and also on the states of the transportation network such as incidents, weather, and road work. In this extended abstract, we consider an incomplete-information environment in which the realizations of the states are unobserved by the travelers. We study how a planner can incentivize the travelers to behave in her favor by strategically designing what and how the travelers get informed about the realizations of the states.
