论文标题
在TLS中适应ECH以通过互联网增强隐私的挑战
Challenges in Adapting ECH in TLS for Privacy Enhancement over the Internet
论文作者
论文摘要
安全和隐私在现代互联网服务中至关重要。运输层安全性（TLS）在很大程度上解决了安全问题。但是，有关访问的服务类型的信息在香草TLS的初始握手中具有平淡的文本，从而有可能揭示用户的活动并损害隐私。 ``加密clienthello''或ECH通过扩展TLS 1.3来克服此问题，其中所有可能揭示服务类型的信息都被掩盖了，从而解决了TLS 1.3中的隐私问题。但是，我们注意到，Internet服务倾向于使用不同版本的TLS用于应用程序数据（主连接/频道）和支持数据（侧渠道），例如调度信息\ textit {etc。}。 ％，在活动会议期间。尽管许多Internet服务已迁移到TLS 1.3，但我们注意到确实从TLS 1.3中受益的主要连接是正确的，而侧渠道继续使用较低版本的TLS（例如1.2）％，该TLS不支持ECH并继续泄漏服务类型。我们证明，从侧通道泄漏的隐私信息可用于影响主要渠道的性能，例如在Internet上阻止或节流特定的服务。我们的工作表明，仅在主要渠道上适应ECH就不足以防止隐私泄漏和攻击主要渠道。此外，我们证明，所有相关的侧通道都必须迁移到TLS 1.3并适应ECH扩展
Security and Privacy are crucial in modern Internet services. Transport Layer Security (TLS) has largely addressed the issue of security. However, information about the type of service being accessed goes in plain-text in the initial handshakes of vanilla TLS, thus potentially revealing the activity of users and compromising privacy. The ``Encrypted ClientHello'' or ECH overcomes this issue by extending TLS 1.3 where all of the information that can potentially reveal the service type is masked, thus addressing the privacy issues in TLS 1.3. However, we notice that Internet services tend to use different versions of TLS for application data (primary connection/channel) and supporting data (side channels) such as scheduling information \textit{etc.}. %, during the active session. Although many internet services have migrated to TLS 1.3, we notice that it is only true for the primary connections which do benefit from TLS 1.3, while the side-channels continue to use lower version of TLS (e.g., 1.2) %which do not support ECH and continue to leak type of service accessed. We demonstrate that privacy information leaked from the side-channels can be used to affect the performance on the primary channels, like blocking or throttling specific service on the internet. Our work demonstrates that adapting ECH on primary channels alone is not sufficient to prevent the privacy leaks and attacks on primary channels. Further, we demonstrate that it is necessary for all of the associated side-channels also to migrate to TLS 1.3 and adapt ECH extension in order to offer complete privacy preservatio
