论文标题
网络中谣言的最佳验证
Optimal Verification of Rumors in Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
当代理偏见并能够验证消息时，我们研究了真实和虚假消息的扩散。作为谣言的接收者，他验证了这一事实，更高的谣言普遍存在会增加真相的普遍性。我们发现情况使情况发生并讨论政策的影响。具体而言，旨在最大化真相普遍存在的计划者应允许谣言流通：如果验证克服了信息的无知，信息传输相对较低，并且计划者的预算引起验证既不太低也不太高。
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a rumor who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher rumor prevalence can increase the prevalence of the truth. We uncover conditions such that this happens and discuss policy implications. Specifically, a planner aiming to maximize the prevalence of the truth should allow rumors to circulate if: verification overcomes ignorance of messages, transmission of information is relatively low, and the planner's budget to induce verification is neither too low nor too high.
