论文标题
参与最大化
Engagement Maximization
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究信息提供的管理以最大程度地提高用户参与度。校长依次向代理商揭示信号，该代理商的信息处理能力有限，可以随时选择退出。我们确定了``稀释''策略（发送罕见但有信息的信号），从而最大程度地提高了用户参与度。该平台的参与度量标准塑造了相对于用户最佳基准的提供信息的偏见的方向和大小。即使没有跨期的承诺，该平台也通过诱使用户的信念保持``与''罕见，决定性信号到达并诱发停止之前的``与''一样``不确定''来复制全额承诺收入。我们将结果应用于两种情况：一个由广告支持的互联网媒体平台和试图吸引测试动机的学生的老师。
We investigate the management of information provision to maximize user engagement. A principal sequentially reveals signals to an agent who has a limited amount of information processing capacity and can choose to exit at any time. We identify a ``dilution'' strategy -- sending rare but highly informative signals -- that maximizes user engagement. The platform's engagement metric shapes the direction and magnitude of biases in provided information relative to a user-optimal benchmark. Even without intertemporal commitment, the platform replicates full-commitment revenue by inducing the user's belief to remain ``as uncertain as'' the prior until the rare, decisive signal arrives and induces stopping. We apply our results to two contexts: an ad-supported internet media platform and a teacher attempting to engage test-motivated students.
