论文标题
集中匹配中的自愿信息披露：效率提高和战略性属性
Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties
论文作者
论文摘要
信息摩擦会损害双面匹配市场中参与者的福利。考虑一个集中的入学，在该集中录取中，大学无法观察到学生在特定的专业或学位课程中为成功的准备。大学选择使用简单，廉价的入学标准，例如高中成绩作为准备的代理或筛选所有应用程序，这对学生和学院来说都是耗时的。为了解决公平和福利的问题，我们介绍了两种新型机制，使学生可以自愿披露私人信息，因此只需要部分筛查。该机制基于递延的接受度，并保留其可靠偏好启示的核心战略特性，尤其是防止策略的启示。此外，我们证明了与不筛查相比，红衣主教福利改善市场参与者的条件。如果公共信息与学生的私人信息微弱相关，并且处理披露的信息的成本足够低，则在直觉上，学生和学院受益于自愿信息披露。最后，我们从丹麦高等教育系统中提供了支持我们模型的关键特征的经验证据。我们的工作对信息摩擦是固有的大型双面市场的机制设计具有政策影响。
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for success in a particular major or degree program. Colleges choose between using simple, cheap admission criteria, e.g., high school grades as a proxy for preparedness, or screening all applications, which is time-consuming for both students and colleges. To address issues of fairness and welfare, we introduce two novel mechanisms that allow students to disclose private information voluntarily and thus only require partial screening. The mechanisms are based on Deferred Acceptance and preserve its core strategic properties of credible preference revelation, particularly ordinal strategy-proofness. In addition, we demonstrate conditions for which cardinal welfare improves for market participants compared to not screening. Intuitively, students and colleges benefit from voluntary information disclosure if public information about students correlates weakly with students' private information and the cost of processing disclosed information is sufficiently low. Finally, we present empirical evidence from the Danish higher education system that supports critical features of our model. Our work has policy implications for the mechanism design of large two-sided markets where information frictions are inherent.
