论文标题
虚假的叙述和政治动员
False Narratives and Political Mobilization
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一种政治平衡模型，其中政治平台与公众舆论竞争。一个平台包括一个政策，一个社会群体的联盟，具有对政策的内在态度的多样化和叙述。我们将叙事概念化为主观模型，将普遍有价值的结果归因于（可能是虚假的）假定原因。当针对经验观察进行量化时，这些模型会产生联盟成员对结果的共同信念，这是其假定原因的函数。这种信念的强度和成员对政策的内在态度决定了联盟动员的力量。只有产生最大动员的平台均以平衡盛行。我们的均衡表征表明，虚假叙事如何对共同利益有害，以及政治分散如何导致其扩散。在均衡中出现的虚假叙述将良好的结果归因于将社会群体排除在统治联盟之外。
We present an equilibrium model of politics in which political platforms compete over public opinion. A platform consists of a policy, a coalition of social groups with diverse intrinsic attitudes to policies, and a narrative. We conceptualize narratives as subjective models that attribute a commonly valued outcome to (potentially spurious) postulated causes. When quantified against empirical observations, these models generate a shared belief among coalition members over the outcome as a function of its postulated causes. The intensity of this belief and the members' intrinsic attitudes to the policy determine the strength of the coalition's mobilization. Only platforms that generate maximal mobilization prevail in equilibrium. Our equilibrium characterization demonstrates how false narratives can be detrimental for the common good, and how political fragmentation leads to their proliferation. The false narratives that emerge in equilibrium attribute good outcomes to the exclusion of social groups from ruling coalitions.
