论文标题
Q-R-Rinrank攻击：彩虹的关键恢复攻击的第一种量子方法
Q-rMinRank attack: The first quantum approach for key recovery attacks on Rainbow
论文作者
论文摘要
最近的基于等级的攻击使彩虹的安全性降低了NIST所设定的安全要求，通过使用经典数学技术加速重复的内核查找操作。如果应用量子算法来执行这些重复的操作，则基于等级的攻击可能更具威胁性，并且可能会大大降低彩虹的安全水平。在本文中，我们提出了一种名为Q-Rinrank Attact的新型缩影攻击，这是对彩虹的关键恢复攻击的第一种量子方法。通过设计可以找到内核的量子电路，我们实现了缩影的二次加速，以恢复彩虹的私钥。我们表明，即使是彩虹的参数v也不符合128位安全级别，这是通过我们的Q-R-Rinrank攻击的最低安全要求。这意味着在量子计算环境中，彩虹不再安全。
Recent rank-based attacks have reduced the security of Rainbow below the security requirements set out by NIST by speeding up repeated kernel finding operations using classical mathematics techniques. If quantum algorithms are applied to perform these repeated operations, the rank-based attacks may be more threatening and could dramatically lower the security level of Rainbow. In this paper, we propose a novel MinRank attack called Q-rMinRank attack, the first quantum approach to the key recovery attacks on Rainbow. By designing quantum circuits that can find the kernel, we achieved quadratic speedup for the MinRank attack to recover the private keys of Rainbow. We show that even the parameter set V of Rainbow does not meet the 128-bit security level, the minimum security requirement through our Q-rMinRank attack. It means that Rainbow is no longer secure in quantum computing environments.
