论文标题
Lalaine:测量和表征不合规的Apple隐私标签
Lalaine: Measuring and Characterizing Non-Compliance of Apple Privacy Labels at Scale
论文作者
论文摘要
作为已知冗长且难以阅读的隐私政策的关键补充,Apple已经启动了App隐私标签,该标签据称可以帮助用户更容易理解应用程序的隐私惯例。但是,虚假和误导性的隐私标签可以将具有隐私意识的消费者欺骗到下载数据密集型应用程序,最终削弱了标签的信誉和完整性。尽管Apple释放了应用程序开发人员创建隐私标签的要求和准则,但对野外隐私标签是否正确且合规的程度知之甚少,这反映了iOS应用程序的实际数据实践。本文根据我们的新方法Lalaine介绍了第一项系统研究,以评估数据流到隐私标签(流到标签)一致性。 Lalaine分析了5,102个iOS应用程序的隐私标签和二进制文件,从而阐明了隐私标签不符合性的普遍性和严重性。我们提供详细的案例研究,并分析对先前理解的不合规性标签的根本原因。这导致了改善隐私标签设计和合规性要求的新见解,因此应用程序开发人员,平台利益相关者和政策制定者可以更好地实现其隐私和问责制目标。 Lalaine的效率和效率很高。我们负责任地向利益相关者报告结果。
As a key supplement to privacy policies that are known to be lengthy and difficult to read, Apple has launched the app privacy labels, which purportedly help users more easily understand an app's privacy practices. However, false and misleading privacy labels can dupe privacy-conscious consumers into downloading data-intensive apps, ultimately eroding the credibility and integrity of the labels. Although Apple releases requirements and guidelines for app developers to create privacy labels, little is known about whether and to what extent the privacy labels in the wild are correct and compliant, reflecting the actual data practices of iOS apps. This paper presents the first systematic study, based on our new methodology named Lalaine, to evaluate data-flow to privacy-label (flow-to-label) consistency. Lalaine analyzed the privacy labels and binaries of 5,102 iOS apps, shedding light on the prevalence and seriousness of privacy-label non-compliance. We provide detailed case studies and analyze root causes for privacy label non-compliance that complements prior understandings. This has led to new insights for improving privacy-label design and compliance requirements, so app developers, platform stakeholders, and policy-makers can better achieve their privacy and accountability goals. Lalaine is thoroughly evaluated for its high effectiveness and efficiency. We are responsibly reporting the results to stakeholders.