论文标题
协调参与式预算的货币捐款
Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting
论文作者
论文摘要
我们正式化了一个协调资金和选择项目的框架，其成本是在具有准线性公用事业功能和个人预算的代理商之间共同的。我们的模型将经典的离散参与预算模型作为特殊情况，同时捕获其他有用的方案。我们提出了几个重要的公理和目标，并研究了它们可以同时满足它们的能力。我们表明，尽管福利最大化承认了FPTA，但福利最大化受到自然而非常弱的参与要求，导致了强烈的不可抗性性。如果我们考虑一些自然限制的估值，即层状估值和对称估值，则将绕开此结果。我们对以前的限制的分析导致发现了针对设置联合背包问题的新的可处理实例，这是组合优化的经典问题。
We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory budgeting model as a special case, while capturing other useful scenarios. We propose several important axioms and objectives and study how well they can be simultaneously satisfied. We show that whereas welfare maximization admits an FPTAS, welfare maximization subject to a natural and very weak participation requirement leads to a strong inapproximability. This result is bypassed if we consider some natural restricted valuations, namely laminar single-minded valuations and symmetric valuations. Our analysis for the former restriction leads to the discovery of a new class of tractable instances for the Set Union Knapsack problem, a classical problem in combinatorial optimization.
