论文标题
信息阈值,贝叶斯推论和决策
Information Threshold, Bayesian Inference and Decision-Making
论文作者
论文摘要
我们将信息阈值定义为先前贝叶斯曲线的最大曲率点,这两种曲线都被描述为所讨论的分类系统的真实正和负速率的函数。阈值的性质是,对于足够足够的二进制分类系统,检索超过阈值的多余信息并不能显着改变我们的分类评估的可靠性。我们在此介绍了“婚姻状况思想实验”来说明这一想法,并报告贝叶斯先前和后验之间以前不确定的数学关系,这可能在决策理论中具有重大的哲学和认识论含义。如果先前的概率是$ ϕ $给出的0和1之间的标量,而后验是$ρ$给出的0和1之间的标量,则在信息阈值时,$ ϕ_e $: $ ϕ_e +ρ_e= 1 $ 否则,鉴于一定程度的先前信念,我们可以在足够的质量证据产生后部时断言它的说服力,使得它们的总和等于1。取得进一步的证据并不能显着提高后验概率,并且可以作为对决策制定信心的信心的基准。
We define the information threshold as the point of maximum curvature in the prior vs. posterior Bayesian curve, both of which are described as a function of the true positive and negative rates of the classification system in question. The nature of the threshold is such that for sufficiently adequate binary classification systems, retrieving excess information beyond the threshold does not significantly alter the reliability of our classification assessment. We hereby introduce the "marital status thought experiment" to illustrate this idea and report a previously undefined mathematical relationship between the Bayesian prior and posterior, which may have significant philosophical and epistemological implications in decision theory. Where the prior probability is a scalar between 0 and 1 given by $ϕ$ and the posterior is a scalar between 0 and 1 given by $ρ$, then at the information threshold, $ϕ_e$: $ϕ_e + ρ_e = 1$ Otherwise stated, given some degree of prior belief, we may assert its persuasiveness when sufficient quality evidence yields a posterior so that their combined sum equals 1. Retrieving further evidence beyond this point does not significantly improve the posterior probability, and may serve as a benchmark for confidence in decision-making.