论文标题
青蛙：前态后Quantum签名
FROG: Forward-Secure Post-Quantum Signature
论文作者
论文摘要
前瞻性签名保证，私钥妥协之前产生的签名仍然安全，因此为现实生活中的应用程序（例如数字取证，审核日志和金融系统）提供了增强的妥协弹性。但是，绝大多数最新的前向安全签名依赖于常规的棘手性假设，因此并不安全地抵抗量子计算机。基于哈希的签名（HBS）（例如，XMSS）可以提供前向量子后安全性。但是，它们仅对于要签署的预定量消息并产生高钥匙一代开销，高昂的签名和较大的签名大小的效率仅有效。开发有效且实用的Quantum-Safe向前安全签名是一个开放的问题，具有可扩展其安全参数的签名功能。 在这项工作中，我们提出了一系列新的量词后签名，我们称之为青蛙（前态后量子后签名）。与HBS替代方案不同，青蛙可以实现具有亚线性钥匙/签名大小和（实际上）无限制的签名能力的高度计算有效签名。这是通过通过MMM构造将合适的后量子签名转换为前部安全设置来实现的。我们调查了突出的量子后安全特征的转化，例如使用MMM，wot和幸福。我们的实验表明，Frog在性能指标的绝大多数（如果不是全部的话）上优于XMS。我们还讨论了这些基本签名方案的一次性变体，这些方案可以将青蛙的性能推向边缘。总体而言，青蛙的性能比具有前瞻性的现有替代方案更好，因此是前向量子后签名的标准化工作的理想选择。
Forward-secure signatures guarantee that the signatures generated before the compromise of private key remain secure, and therefore offer an enhanced compromise-resiliency for real-life applications such as digital forensics, audit logs, and financial systems. However, the vast majority of state-of-the-art forward-secure signatures rely on conventional intractability assumptions and therefore are not secure against quantum computers. Hash-based signatures (HBS) (e.g., XMSS) can offer forward-secure post-quantum security. However, they are efficient only for a pre-defined number of messages to be signed and incur high key generation overhead, highly expensive signing, and large signature sizes for an increasing number of messages. It is an open problem to develop quantum-safe forward-secure signatures that are efficient and practical with a signing capability scalable to their security parameters. In this work, we propose a new series of post-quantum signatures that we call FROG (Forward-secuRe pOst-quantum siGnature). Unlike HBS alternatives, FROG can achieve highly computational efficient signatures with sub-linear key/signature sizes and (practically) unbounded signing capability. This is achieved by transforming suitable post-quantum signatures into forward-secure settings via MMM constructions. We investigated the transformation of prominent post-quantum secure signatures such as Dilithium, WOTS, and BLISS with MMM. Our experiments indicate that FROG outperforms XMSS for the vast majority (if not all for a large number of messages) of performance metrics. We also discuss one-time variants of these base signature schemes that can push the performance of FROG to the edge. Overall, FROG shows a better performance than the existing alternatives with forward-security and therefore is an ideal alternative for the standardization efforts for forward-secure post-quantum signatures.
