论文标题
与公司的互补偏好的双面匹配
Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了双方匹配的双方匹配，其中企业具有互补的偏好。我们表明，在平衡性条件下存在稳定的匹配，该条件排除了由公司可接受的集合形成的特定类型的奇数周期。我们还提供满足此条件的偏好概况。我们的结果表明，稳定的匹配与广泛的公司的互补偏好兼容。
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms' acceptable sets. We also provide a class of preference profiles that satisfy this condition. Our results indicate that stable matching is compatible with a wide range of firms' complementary preferences.
