论文标题
主管对秘密执行者攻击者的混淆
Supervisor Obfuscation Against Covert Actuator Attackers
论文作者
论文摘要
这项工作调查了将混淆的主管与秘密执行者攻击者综合的问题。 For a non-resilient supervisor S, for which there exist some covert actuator attackers that are capable of inflicting damage, we propose an algorithm to compute all the obfuscated supervisors, with the requirements that: 1) any obfuscated supervisor S' is resilient against any covert actuator attacker, and 2) the original closed-behavior of the closed-loop system under S is preserved, that is, any混淆的主管S'的控制与原始的非弹性主管S相同。我们证明，设计的算法可以合成混淆的主管免受隐秘执行器的攻击，这是合理的且完整的。
This work investigates the problem of synthesizing obfuscated supervisors against covert actuator attackers. For a non-resilient supervisor S, for which there exist some covert actuator attackers that are capable of inflicting damage, we propose an algorithm to compute all the obfuscated supervisors, with the requirements that: 1) any obfuscated supervisor S' is resilient against any covert actuator attacker, and 2) the original closed-behavior of the closed-loop system under S is preserved, that is, any obfuscated supervisor S' is control equivalent to the original non-resilient supervisor S. We prove that the designed algorithm to synthesize obfuscated supervisors against covert actuator attack is sound and complete.
