论文标题

选民可以在打印选票上发现错误吗?绝对地

Can Voters Detect Errors on Their Printed Ballots? Absolutely

论文作者

Kortum, Philip, Byrne, Michael D., Azubike, Chidera O., Roty, Laura E.

论文摘要

关于选民在投票标记设备(BMD)上进行选择后,选民是否可以发现其印刷投票的恶意变化仍有争议。在这项研究中,我们在选民选择BMD之后对选民投票进行了更改。然后,我们要求他们检查他们的选票,以了解他们过去投票的板岩的任何变化。总体准确性异常高。参与者看到了1440场比赛,在这1440个中,共有4个错误,因此总准确度为99.8%。无论投票长度,投票类型,改变的种族数量以及改变种族的位置,参与者都能以几乎完美的精度表现。检测性能非常强大。我们得出的结论是,通过适当的方向和资源,选民可以在用BMD投票后,在印刷纸情况下进行投票更改。随着BMD使用的不断增长,这一发现对投票社区具有重大影响。现在,研究应集中于确定行为和行为方法,这些方法将促使和鼓励选民在投票框中放下其BMD生成的选票。

There is still debate on whether voters can detect malicious changes in their printed ballot after making their selections on a Ballot Marking Device (BMD). In this study, we altered votes on a voter's ballot after they had made their selections on a BMD. We then required them to examine their ballots for any changes from the slate they used to vote. Overall accuracy was exceptionally high. Participants saw 1440 total contests, and of those 1440, there were a total of 4 errors, so total accuracy was 99.8%. Participants were able to perform with near-perfect accuracy regardless of ballot length, ballot type, number of altered races, and location of altered races. Detection performance was extremely robust. We conclude that with proper direction and resources, voters can be near-perfect detectors of ballot changes on printed paper ballots after voting with a BMD. This finding has significant implications for the voting community as BMD use continues to grow. Research should now focus on identifying administrative and behavioral methods that will prompt and encourage voters to check their BMD-generated ballots before they drop them in the ballot box.

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