论文标题
向知情卖方提供数据
Data Provision to an Informed Seller
论文作者
论文摘要
垄断卖方私下且不完美地了解了买方产品的价值。卖方使用信息来区分买方。设计师提供了一种机制，该机制可根据卖方的报告为卖方提供其他信息。我们确定了出于福利目的进行筛查的可能性，即设计师可以通过向所有卖方类型提供相同的信号来实现买方剩余和卖方利润的任何可实施组合。我们使用此结果来表征一组可实施的福利成果，研究卖方获取第三方数据的动机，并证明买方盈余与效率之间的权衡。
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information based on the seller's report about her type. We establish the impossibility of screening for welfare purposes, i.e., the designer can attain any implementable combination of buyer surplus and seller profit by providing the same signal to all seller types. We use this result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes, study the seller's incentive to acquire third-party data, and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.
