论文标题
固定优先交易周期的简单优势
Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在分配问题的背景下，通过简单的主导机制（Pycia and Troyan，2019）研究了固定优先交易周期（FPTTC）规则的实施，在这种情况下，不允许在最多不可分割的物体和货币转移者分配代理。我们考虑这两个模型 - 有和没有外部选项，并且在这两个模型中都表征所有仅主要的FPTTC规则。我们进一步介绍了简单的防止策略，以解决该问题，而代理商则关心具有时间不一致的偏好，并以简单的优势讨论其关系。
We study the implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules via simply dominant mechanisms (Pycia and Troyan, 2019) in the context of assignment problems, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We consider both models - with and without outside options, and characterize all simply dominant FPTTC rules in both models. We further introduce the notion of simple strategy-proofness to resolve the issue with agents being concerned about having time-inconsistent preferences, and discuss its relation with simple dominance.
