论文标题
攻击者比赛的平衡
Equilibria of Attacker-Defender Games
论文作者
论文摘要
掠夺性捕获的尝试可能会引起防御反应，从而降低了预期资源的价值。我们提供了对同时移动，两人攻击者犯罪者游戏的游戏理论分析，该游戏对这种交互作用进行了建模。当初始捐赠相等时，攻击者在平衡中赢得了大约三分之一的此类游戏。在权力差异下，攻击者比防守者差三分之一时变得尤为积极。当他们的对手获得高效率，低成本生产并在单方面提供高效率，高成本的生产方案时，攻击者的对手有非冲突的外部选择攻击者会变得异常激进。
Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions. When initial endowments are equal, Attackers win about a third of such games in equilibrium. Under power disparities, Attackers become particularly aggressive when they are approximately one-third poorer than Defenders. With non-conflictual outside options Attackers become exceptionally aggressive when their opponent has access to high-benefit, low-cost production, and refrain from attack most when they are unilaterally provided with a high-benefit, high-cost production option.
