论文标题
多维网络安全游戏:攻击者和辩护人如何在并行目标上战斗?
Multi-dimensional Network Security Game: How do attacker and defender battle on parallel targets?
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中,我们考虑了一个新的网络安全游戏,其中攻击者和后卫正在与“多个”目标作斗争。这种类型的游戏适用于建模许多当前网络安全冲突,例如Internet网络钓鱼,移动恶意软件或网络入侵。在这样的攻击中,攻击者和辩护人需要决定如何在每个目标上分配资源,以便在其资源限制内最大化其效用。我们将这种多维网络安全游戏建模为受约束的非零和游戏。考虑了两个安全违规模型,即产品形式和比例形式。对于每个违规模型,我们根据Rosen的定理证明存在独特的NASH平衡(NE),并提出有效的算法以在严格凹入时找到NE。此外,当严格的凹度不存在时,我们显示了产品形式破坏模型中的多个NE。我们的研究阐明了攻击者和辩护人的战略行为,特别是他们如何将资源分配给具有不同权重的目标,以及其公用事业和策略如何受到资源限制的影响。
In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing, mobile malware or network intrusions. In such attacks, the attacker and the defender need to decide how to allocate resources on each target so as to maximize his utility within his resource limit. We model such a multi-dimensional network security game as a constrained non-zero sum game. Two security breaching models, the product-form and the proportion-form, are considered. For each breaching model, we prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) based on Rosen's theorem and propose efficient algorithms to find the NE when the games are strictly concave. Furthermore, we show the existence of multiple NEs in the product-form breaching model when the strict concavity does not hold. Our study sheds light on the strategic behaviors of the attacker and the defender, in particular, on how they allocate resources to the targets which have different weights, and how their utilities as well as strategies are influenced by the resource constraints.