论文标题
公平的分裂，金钱和价格
Fair Division with Money and Prices
论文作者
论文摘要
我们使用现金转移来有效地将一堆不可分割的商品划分为不可分割的商品，以确保用货币线性线性的代理商之间的公平性。我们根据他们向参与者提供的担保（最坏情况）的保证（最坏的案例效用）来比较三个可行性可行和隐私保护规则。在第一个版本的Divide和选择对N代理商中，他们出价为Divider的角色，然后每个人都在分区的股票上竞标。在第二个版本中，每个代理都宣布一个分区，他们都竞标选择最有效的一个分区。在竞标和卖出规则中，代理商竞标卖方的角色：有两个代理商最小的投标定义了卖方，然后卖方收取仅受到赢得竞标的任何价格的费用。这两种规则都会奖励亚辅助公用事业，并惩罚超迪基的实用程序，而B＆S则比两个D＆C S都更重要。当代理商安全时，B＆S也可以更好地可以收集更大的剩余部分。
We divide efficiently a pile of indivisible goods in common property, using cash transfers to ensure fairness among agents with utility linear in money. We compare three cognitively feasible and privacy preserving division rules in terms of the guarantees (worst case utility) they offer to the participants. In the first version of Divide & Choose to n agents, they bid for the role of Divider then everyone bids on the shares of the Divider's partition. In the second version each agent announces a partition and they all bid to select the most efficient one. In the Bid & Sell rule the agents bid for the role of Seller: with two agents the smallest bid defines the Seller who then charges any price constrained only by her winning bid. Both rules reward subadditive utilities and penalise superadditive ones, and B&S more so than both D&C-s. B&S is also better placed to collect a larger share of the surplus when agents play safe.
