论文标题
出行游戏的设计和分析
The Design and Analysis of a Mobility Game
论文作者
论文摘要
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on efficiency of the travelers' behavioral decision-making. In our framework, we introduce a mobility ``pricing mechanism," in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at不同的运输中心。我们表明，旅行者的自私行动导致了纯净的纳什均衡。然后，我们执行无政府状态分析的价格，以确定随着旅行者数量的增加，移动系统的效率低下相对较低。我们通过扩展我们的建模框架来使用前景理论来捕获旅行者的主观行为，从而偏离对决策的标准理论分析。最后，我们提供了一项模拟研究，作为我们提出的移动性游戏的概念证明。
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on efficiency of the travelers' behavioral decision-making. In our framework, we introduce a mobility ``pricing mechanism," in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers' selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy analysis to establish that the mobility system's inefficiencies remain relatively low as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our modeling framework to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a simulation study as a proof of concept for our proposed mobility game.
