论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Assessing Privacy Risks from Feature Vector Reconstruction Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
在深层神经网络以进行面部识别中,特征向量是捕获给定面部独特特征的数值表示。虽然众所周知,可以通过“特征重建”恢复原始面孔的版本,但我们对这些攻击产生的端到端隐私风险缺乏了解。在这项工作中,我们通过开发有意义地捕获重建面部图像的威胁的指标来解决这一缺点。使用端到端的实验和用户研究,我们表明,重建的面部图像能够以最糟糕的速度进行商业面部识别系统和人类的重新识别,比随机基线高四倍。我们的结果证实,应将功能向量确认为个人可识别信息(PII),以保护用户隐私。
In deep neural networks for facial recognition, feature vectors are numerical representations that capture the unique features of a given face. While it is known that a version of the original face can be recovered via "feature reconstruction," we lack an understanding of the end-to-end privacy risks produced by these attacks. In this work, we address this shortcoming by developing metrics that meaningfully capture the threat of reconstructed face images. Using end-to-end experiments and user studies, we show that reconstructed face images enable re-identification by both commercial facial recognition systems and humans, at a rate that is at worst, a factor of four times higher than randomized baselines. Our results confirm that feature vectors should be recognized as Personal Identifiable Information (PII) in order to protect user privacy.