论文标题
效率与重复双边贸易的（OUT）中介
Efficiency with(out) intermediation in repeated bilateral trade
论文作者
论文摘要
本文分析了双边贸易模型的重复版本，其中独立收益与买方和卖方的私人信息相关。使用此设置，这做出了以下五个贡献。首先，它在模型的基础上得出了必要和充分的条件，即何时可以在预算余额和参与限制下达到效率。其次，这样一来，它引入了预算余额的中间概念，称为临时预算余额，该余额允许延长流动性，但在此处解释为中介机构的发行权限的参与限制。第三，它销毁了所有可能的机制的类别，这些机制可以在有或没有中介机构的情况下实施有效分配。第四，它为中介在信息限制下的动态机制设计模型中的作用奠定了基础。而且，第五，它主张对“民间主张”的仔细解释，即在预算后的平衡和转移的可观察性下，较少的信息对动态机制的效率更好。
This paper analyzes repeated version of the bilateral trade model where the independent payoff relevant private information of the buyer and the seller is correlated across time. Using this setup it makes the following five contributions. First, it derives necessary and sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model as to when efficiency can be attained under ex post budget balance and participation constraints. Second, in doing so, it introduces an intermediate notion of budget balance called interim budget balance that allows for the extension of liquidity but with participation constraints for the issuing authority interpreted here as an intermediary. Third, it pins down the class of all possible mechanisms that can implement the efficient allocation with and without an intermediary. Fourth, it provides a foundation for the role of an intermediary in a dynamic mechanism design model under informational constraints. And, fifth, it argues for a careful interpretation of the "folk proposition" that less information is better for efficiency in dynamic mechanisms under ex post budget balance and observability of transfers.
