论文标题
美国工资历史禁令 - 求职者的战略披露和性别薪酬差距
US Salary History Bans -- Strategic Disclosure by Job Applicants and the Gender Pay Gap
论文作者
论文摘要
我研究了美国薪金历史禁令的影响，该禁令限制雇主在招聘过程中询问求职者的薪水历史，但允许候选人自愿共享信息。使用差异性设计，我表明这些政策在下午2点之前大大缩小了性别薪酬差距，这几乎完全是由于女性收入的增加而驱动的。禁令也成功地削弱了当前和未来收益之间的自动相关性，尤其是在改变工作的人之间。我提供了新的证据表明，当雇主再也无法推动候选人以获取信息时，在求职者中自愿披露薪水历史的可能性减少了，到了下午2点。在女性中更多。然后，我开发了一个具有不对称信息的工资谈判模型，我允许工作申请人选择是否揭示薪酬历史记录，并使用此框架来解释我关于披露行为和性别薪酬差距的经验发现。
I study the effects of US salary history bans which restrict employers from inquiring about job applicants' pay history during the hiring process, but allow candidates to voluntarily share information. Using a difference-in-differences design, I show that these policies narrowed the gender pay gap significantly by 2 p.p., driven almost entirely by an increase in female earnings. The bans were also successful in weakening the auto-correlation between current and future earnings, especially among job-changers. I provide novel evidence showing that when employers could no longer nudge candidates for information, the likelihood of voluntarily disclosing salary history decreased among job applicants and by 2 p.p. more among women. I then develop a salary negotiation model with asymmetric information, where I allow job applicants to choose whether to reveal pay history, and use this framework to explain my empirical findings on disclosure behavior and gender pay gap.
