论文标题
最快发现对网络物理系统的欺骗攻击,并具有简约的水印政策
Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy
论文作者
论文摘要
在控制输入中添加物理水印信号会增加数据欺骗攻击的检测概率,而牺牲控制成本的增加。在本文中,我们提出了一项简约的政策,以减少不存在攻击的水印事件的平均数量,从而降低了控制成本。我们将系统建模为随机最佳控制问题,并应用动态编程以最大程度地减少误报率(FAR)和增加控制成本的固定上限的平均检测延迟(add)。最佳解决方案导致有关攻击的后验概率的两个阈值策略,该攻击的概率是从Shiryaev统计数据中得出的,假设变更点是带有几何分布的随机变量。我们得出了添加的近似表达,并应用了非线性更新理论。还得出了攻击前添加的水印的平均水印与控制成本增加之间的关系。我们设计了最佳的水印,该水标能够最大化Kullback-Leibler Divergence,以增加控制成本的固定增加。进行仿真研究以说明和验证理论结果。
The addition of a physical watermarking signal to the control input increases the detection probability of data deception attacks at the expense of increased control cost. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious policy to reduce the average number of watermarking events when the attack is not present, which in turn reduces the control cost. We model the system as a stochastic optimal control problem and apply the dynamic programming to minimize the average detection delay (ADD) for fixed upper bounds on false alarm rate (FAR) and increased control cost. The optimal solution results in a two threshold policy on the posterior probability of attack, which is derived from the Shiryaev statistics for sequential change detection assuming the change point is a random variable with a geometric distribution. We derive approximate expressions of ADD and FAR applying the non-linear renewal theory. The relationship between the average number of watermarking added before the attack and the increase in control cost is also derived. We design the optimal watermarking that maximizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence for a fixed increase in the control cost. Simulation studies are performed to illustrate and validate the theoretical results.