论文标题
Minmax价值的规律性和多人Blackwell游戏中的平衡
Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games
论文作者
论文摘要
A real-valued function $φ$ that is defined over all Borel sets of a topological space is \emph{regular} if for every Borel set $W$, $φ(W)$ is the supremum of $φ(C)$, over all closed sets $C$ that are contained in $W$, and the infimum of $φ(O)$, over all open sets $O$ that contain $W$. 我们学习有限很多玩家的布莱克韦尔游戏。我们表明,当每个玩家都有一组可数的动作,并且某个玩家的目标由Borel获胜集表示,则该玩家的Minmax值是常规的。 然后,我们使用Minmax值的规律性来确定在两个不同类别的Blackwell游戏中的$ \ Varepsilon $平衡的存在。一个是$ n $ - 玩家的布莱克韦尔游戏的类别,每个玩家都有有限的动作空间和分析性获胜,而播放器上的Minmax值的总和超过了$ n-1 $。另一个类是具有有界的上半分析收益功能,独立于历史的有限动作空间和与历史无关的Minmax值的Blackwell游戏。 对于后类,我们获得了一组均衡收益的表征。
A real-valued function $φ$ that is defined over all Borel sets of a topological space is \emph{regular} if for every Borel set $W$, $φ(W)$ is the supremum of $φ(C)$, over all closed sets $C$ that are contained in $W$, and the infimum of $φ(O)$, over all open sets $O$ that contain $W$. We study Blackwell games with finitely many players. We show that when each player has a countable set of actions and the objective of a certain player is represented by a Borel winning set, that player's minmax value is regular. We then use the regularity of the minmax value to establish the existence of $\varepsilon$-equilibria in two distinct classes of Blackwell games. One is the class of $n$-player Blackwell games where each player has a finite action space and an analytic winning set, and the sum of the minmax values over the players exceeds $n-1$. The other class is that of Blackwell games with bounded upper semi-analytic payoff functions, history-independent finite action spaces, and history-independent minmax values. For the latter class, we obtain a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs.