论文标题
基于群集事件的隐私保护COVID-19暴露通知
Privacy-Protecting COVID-19 Exposure Notification Based on Cluster Events
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提供了一个简单的系统设计的粗略草图，以基于聚类事件的共同态度的共同感染的接触通知 - 位置和时间，其中有测试阳性（TP）个体的阈值数量。与其他设计（例如DP3T或Apple-Google暴露通知系统）不同，此设计不会基于检测到与TP个人的直接距离跟踪或通知。 该设计利用了相对便宜且返回的Covid-19的现有或开发测试不到一个小时，并且具有很高的特异性，但灵敏度可能较低。它还为手机和类似设备使用易于可用的位置跟踪。它报告了TP个人出现的事件，但没有将事件与个人或个人历史上的其他事件联系起来。参与的个人被通知被检测到的聚类事件。然后，他们可以将它们与自己的位置历史记录进行比较。可以通过公共渠道公开检测到的集群事件。因此，未参加报告系统的个人仍然可以通知暴露。 适当的安全分析超出了此设计草图的范围。但是，我们确实讨论了对各种对手的抵抗以及对隐私的攻击以及虚假报告的攻击。
We provide a rough sketch of a simple system design for exposure notification of COVID-19 infections based on copresence at cluster events -- locations and times where a threshold number of tested-positive (TP) individuals were present. Unlike other designs, such as DP3T or the Apple-Google exposure-notification system, this design does not track or notify based on detecting direct proximity to TP individuals. The design makes use of existing or in-development tests for COVID-19 that are relatively cheap and return results in less than an hour, and that have high specificity but may have lower sensitivity. It also uses readily available location tracking for mobile phones and similar devices. It reports events at which TP individuals were present but does not link events with individuals or with other events in an individual's history. Participating individuals are notified of detected cluster events. They can then compare these locally to their own location history. Detected cluster events can be publicized through public channels. Thus, individuals not participating in the reporting system can still be notified of exposure. A proper security analysis is beyond the scope of this design sketch. We do, however, discuss resistance to various adversaries and attacks on privacy as well as false-reporting attacks.
