论文标题
关于时间滞后的误指定信念
Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了贝叶斯代理人的长期行为，他对行动和反馈之间的时间滞后有误指出的信念，并了解了随着时间的推移，其行动的回报后果。关于时间滞后的错误指定的信念会导致归因错误，当代理人的行动汇聚时，这些错误没有长期影响，但是当他的行动周期时，可能会导致任意长期的长期效率。我们的证明使用集中度不平等来绑定动作开关的频率，这对于研究历史依赖性的学习问题很有用。我们应用方法来研究一个对时间滞后和具有误指定信念的公众的政策制定者之间的政策选择游戏。
We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his actions over time. Misspecified beliefs about time lags result in attribution errors, which have no long-term effect when the agent's action converges, but can lead to arbitrarily large long-term inefficiencies when his action cycles. Our proof uses concentration inequalities to bound the frequency of action switches, which are useful to study learning problems with history dependence. We apply our methods to study a policy choice game between a policy-maker who has a correctly specified belief about the time lag and the public who has a misspecified belief.
