论文标题
通过信息获取的责任设计
Liability Design with Information Acquisition
论文作者
论文摘要
如何保证公司在推出潜在危险产品之前进行尽职调查？当（i）有限责任阻止公司内部化可能造成的全部损害时，我们研究责任规则的设计，（ii）仅在损害发生损失的情况下，无论该产品的固有风险如何，（iii）公司在执行尽职调查之前就其产品的风险有私人信息。我们表明，（i）任何责任机制都可以由关税可以实现，该关税仅取决于公司获得的证据，如果发生损失，而不是公司关于其私人信息的任何初步报告，（ii）在产品风险上始终执行更高的可观效果之前分配较高的公司的公司，那么在简单和直觉的条件下进行了更为最佳的启动，则可以使用更为最佳的范围。
How to guarantee that firms perform due diligence before launching potentially dangerous products? We study the design of liability rules when (i) limited liability prevents firms from internalizing the full damage they may cause, (ii) penalties are paid only if damage occurs, regardless of the product's inherent riskiness, (iii) firms have private information about their products' riskiness before performing due diligence. We show that (i) any liability mechanism can be implemented by a tariff that depends only on the evidence acquired by the firm if a damage occurs, not on any initial report by the firm about its private information, (ii) firms that assign a higher prior to product riskiness always perform more due diligence but less than is socially optimal, and (iii) under a simple and intuitive condition, any type-specific launch thresholds can be implemented by a monotonic tariff.
