论文标题
竞争，政治和社交媒体
Competition, Politics, & Social Media
论文作者
论文摘要
越来越多的政客依靠更便宜，更容易访问在线社交媒体平台等技术来与他们的选区进行交流。这些平台向政客提供了廉价且低级的沟通渠道，这可能会通过允许许多人参加政治竞赛来增强政治竞争。在这项研究中，我们证明，降低沟通成本（使许多参赛者都进入竞争市场，当新移民通过向选民提供更多信息而竞争时，可以加强现任者的立场。我们展示了不对称的坏新闻新闻效应，其中早期的负面新闻损害了挑战者，而不是积极的消息使他们受益匪浅，因此总体而言，现任政治家获胜的机会在市场上更多的参与者更高。我们的发现表明，通过社交媒体和其他平台的沟通可以加剧竞争，如何加强任务优势，而不是作为进入政治市场的更多参与者的结果而削弱。
An increasing number of politicians are relying on cheaper, easier to access technologies such as online social media platforms to communicate with their constituency. These platforms present a cheap and low-barrier channel of communication to politicians, potentially intensifying political competition by allowing many to enter political races. In this study, we demonstrate that lowering costs of communication, which allows many entrants to come into a competitive market, can strengthen an incumbent's position when the newcomers compete by providing more information to the voters. We show an asymmetric bad-news-good-news effect where early negative news hurts the challengers more than the positive news benefit them, such that in aggregate, an incumbent politician's chances of winning is higher with more entrants in the market. Our findings indicate that communication through social media and other platforms can intensify competition, how-ever incumbency advantage may be strengthened rather than weakened as an outcome of higher number of entrants into a political market.
