论文标题
以太坊区块链的交易费用机制设计：EIP-1559的经济分析
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559
论文作者
论文摘要
EIP-1559是为以太坊的交易费用机制增添多个紧密耦合的建议，包括可变大小的块和烧毁的基本费用，并随着需求而增加和下降。该报告评估了提案的游戏理论优势和劣势，并探讨了一些替代设计。
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs.
