论文标题
连锁共识的安全分析
Security Analysis of Ripple Consensus
论文作者
论文摘要
Ripple网络是最杰出的区块链平台之一，其本地XRP令牌目前是加密货币市值最高的。连锁共识协议为该网络提供了支持，通常被视为拜占庭式断层协议协议协议协议，该协议可以在存在错误或恶意节点的情况下达成共识。与传统的拜占庭协议协议相反，对于连锁共识中的所有参与节点都没有全球知识。取而代之的是，每个节点都会宣布其信任的其他节点列表，并从中考虑投票。 先前的工作引起了人们对最初由Ripple所说的一般假设所说的共识协议的可观和安全性的担忧，目前尚无对其工作及其在文献中的特性的了解。本文缩小了这一差距，并做出了两个贡献。它首先提供了对协议的详细，抽象的描述，该描述是从源代码得出的。其次，该论文指出，在相对良性的网络假设下，抽象协议可能违反了几个简单执行的安全性和可笑性。
The Ripple network is one of the most prominent blockchain platforms and its native XRP token currently has one of the highest cryptocurrency market capitalizations. The Ripple consensus protocol powers this network and is generally considered to a Byzantine fault-tolerant agreement protocol, which can reach consensus in the presence of faulty or malicious nodes. In contrast to traditional Byzantine agreement protocols, there is no global knowledge of all participating nodes in Ripple consensus; instead, each node declares a list of other nodes that it trusts and from which it considers votes. Previous work has brought up concerns about the liveness and safety of the consensus protocol under the general assumptions stated initially by Ripple, and there is currently no appropriate understanding of its workings and its properties in the literature. This paper closes this gap and makes two contributions. It first provides a detailed, abstract description of the protocol, which has been derived from the source code. Second, the paper points out that the abstract protocol may violate safety and liveness in several simple executions under relatively benign network assumptions.
