论文标题
使用前景理论设计激励机制，以促进生产者的卖空行为更好
Design of Incentive Mechanisms Using Prospect Theory to Promote Better Sell-back Behavior among Prosumers
论文作者
论文摘要
现在，用户可以使用分布式资源将能量回馈网格。此类用户（也称为生产者）需要适当的激励机制，以便在维持零售商的利润的同时最大化卖出金额。但是，所有现有的文献都考虑了预期的实用性理论（EUT），他们认为生产商可以最大限度地提高其预期的回报。我们考虑前景理论（PT），该理论以更好的方式在不确定性面前模拟人类的行为。我们表明，与EUT计算的合同相比，在日常合同定价机制中，合同的实际最佳价值和卖出金额可能较小。我们还提出了一种基于彩票的机制，并表明与日常合同定价相比，这种机制可以增加零售商的储蓄，同时增加零售商的储蓄。
Users can now give back energies to the grid using distributed resources. Proper incentive mechanisms are required for such users, also known as prosumers, in order to maximize the sell-back amount while maintaining the retailer's profit. However, all the existing literature considers expected utility theory (EUT) where they assume that prosumers maximize their expected payoff. We consider prospect theory (PT) which models the behavior of humans in the face of uncertainty in a better manner. We show that in a day-ahead contract pricing mechanism, the actual optimal value of contract and the sell-back amount may be smaller compared to the one computed by the EUT. We also propose a lottery-based mechanism and show that such a mechanism can increase the sell-back amount while increasing the retailer's savings compared to day-ahead contract pricing.
