论文标题
诚实的声誉
A Reputation for Honesty
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了玩家为诚实而不是发挥特定行动的声誉的情况。面对一系列短期对手的耐心球员在观察到特殊的冲击和球员行动之前，宣布了他们的预期行动。患者玩家是一种诚实的类型，其行动与他们的公告相吻合，或者可以自由选择自己的行动的机会主义类型。我们表明，当短期玩家对哪些患者玩家的行动目前可行的情况不确定性时，患者玩家可以通过诚实而闻名来获得高收益，但如果没有这种不确定性，可能会获得低收益。
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an idiosyncratic shock, and before players act. The patient player is either an honest type whose action coincides with their announcement, or an opportunistic type who can freely choose their actions. We show that the patient player can secure a high payoff by building a reputation for being honest when the short-run players face uncertainty about which of the patient player's actions are currently feasible, but may receive a low payoff when there is no such uncertainty.
