论文标题
TLS拦截机制和动机的调查和分析
A survey and analysis of TLS interception mechanisms and motivations
论文作者
论文摘要
TLS是一种端到端协议，旨在提供机密性和完整性确保改善最终用户安全性和隐私。尽管TLS有助于防御对截获的未加密流量的普遍监视，但它也阻碍了Middleboxs通常在网络流量上执行的几项常见的有益操作。因此，已经提出了各种方法，即通过在中间解决方案中使用钥匙和证书来“绕过” TLS的机密目标，以及扩展协议以适应第三方，代表团方案，对受信任的米德箱以及罚款和验证机制的新提案。我们首先审查了期望HTTP流量普通的用例，并讨论TLS阻碍这些操作的程度。我们保留了19个场景，其中仍然相关地访问未加密的流量并评估所涉及的利益相关者的激励措施。其次，我们调查了TLS不再提供端到端安全性的30个方案，并通过此计划更改“结束”的概念，包括缓存的中间箱，例如内容传递网络。最后，我们根据可部署性和安全特征比较每个计划，并评估其与利益相关者激励措施的兼容性。我们的分析导致了许多关键的发现，观察和研究问题，我们认为这对从业者，政策制定者和研究人员来说将会引起人们的关注。
TLS is an end-to-end protocol designed to provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees that improve end-user security and privacy. While TLS helps defend against pervasive surveillance of intercepted unencrypted traffic, it also hinders several common beneficial operations typically performed by middleboxes on the network traffic. Consequently, various methods have been proposed that "bypass" the confidentiality goals of TLS by playing with keys and certificates essentially in a man-in-the-middle solution, as well as new proposals that extend the protocol to accommodate third parties, delegation schemes to trusted middleboxes, and fine-grained control and verification mechanisms. We first review the use cases expecting plain HTTP traffic and discuss the extent to which TLS hinders these operations. We retain 19 scenarios where access to unencrypted traffic is still relevant and evaluate the incentives of the stakeholders involved. Second, we survey 30 schemes by which TLS no longer delivers end-to-end security, and by which the notion of an "end" changes, including caching middleboxes such as Content Delivery Networks. Finally, we compare each scheme based on deployability and security characteristics, and evaluate their compatibility with the stakeholders' incentives. Our analysis leads to a number of key findings, observations, and research questions that we believe will be of interest to practitioners, policy makers and researchers.
