论文标题
多因素物理层安全性身份验证
Multi-factor Physical Layer Security Authentication in Short Blocklength Communication
论文作者
论文摘要
最近引起了很多关注的物理层的轻质和低潜伏期安全方案包括：（i）物理无倾斜功能（PUF），（ii）基于本地化的身份验证，以及（iii）来自无线褪色系数的秘密密钥生成（SKG）。在本文中，我们专注于简短的区块长度，并提出了一个快速，隐私的多因素身份验证协议，该协议将PUF，接近度估计和SKG唯一结合。我们专注于延迟限制的应用程序，并通过提供三个频道代码家族的数值比较（包括一半的速率低密度均等校验验证代码（LDPC），Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem（BCH），以及极性Slepian Wolf代码n = 512，Skg iniip组合n = 512 keys组合。快速重新认证的恢复协议。拟议中的相互认证方案的所有方案均通过使用Burrows，Abadi和Needham（BAN）以及Mao和Boyd（MB）逻辑以及Tamarin-Prover的正式证明证明是安全的。
Lightweight and low latency security schemes at the physical layer that have recently attracted a lot of attention include: (i) physical unclonable functions (PUFs), (ii) localization based authentication, and, (iii) secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients. In this paper, we focus on short blocklengths and propose a fast, privacy preserving, multi-factor authentication protocol that uniquely combines PUFs, proximity estimation and SKG. We focus on delay constrained applications and demonstrate the performance of the SKG scheme in the short blocklength by providing a numerical comparison of three families of channel codes, including half rate low density parity check codes (LDPC), Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH), and, Polar Slepian Wolf codes for n=512, 1024. The SKG keys are incorporated in a zero-round-trip-time resumption protocol for fast re-authentication. All schemes of the proposed mutual authentication protocol are shown to be secure through formal proofs using Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) and Mao and Boyd (MB) logic as well as the Tamarin-prover.
