论文标题
平等社会福利预算部门公平的价格
Price of Fairness in Budget Division for Egalitarian Social Welfare
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个参与性的预算问题，即汇总了代理商的偏好并将预算分配于项目。预算部门解决方案是项目的概率分布。我们研究的主要目的涉及系统最佳解决方案与公平解决方案之间的比较。我们有兴趣评估公平解决方案的质量，即，与最大化（平等）社会福利的公平分配相比，在公平分配下衡量系统效率损失。该指标称为公平的价格。我们也对几个汇总规则的性能感兴趣。既有公平性的价格和汇总规则的效率保证，既有渐近的紧密界限。
We study a participatory budgeting problem of aggregating the preferences of agents and dividing a budget over the projects. A budget division solution is a probability distribution over the projects. The main purpose of our study concerns the comparison between the system optimum solution and a fair solution. We are interested in assessing the quality of fair solutions, i.e., in measuring the system efficiency loss under a fair allocation compared to the one that maximizes (egalitarian) social welfare. This indicator is called the price of fairness. We are also interested in the performance of several aggregation rules. Asymptotically tight bounds are provided both for the price of fairness and the efficiency guarantee of aggregation rules.
