论文标题
为参与性预算投票
Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting
论文作者
论文摘要
我们解决了在参与式预算的背景下汇总选民偏好的问题。我们仔细检查了当前在实践中使用的投票方法，强调其缺点，并引入了一种针对此环境量身定制的新颖计划，我们称之为“ knapsack投票”。我们研究其战略性特性 - 我们表明，它在自然的实用程序模型下（由$ \ ell_1 $在结果与选民的真实偏好之间的距离给出），并且在一般增式实用性下“部分地”策略 - 防止策略。我们将主背包投票扩展到具有收入，缺陷或盈余的更一般环境，并证明了类似的策略结果。为了进一步证明我们计划的适用性，我们讨论了它在与全国许多城市的地方政府机构合作部署的数字投票平台上的实施。从因此收集的投票数据中，我们提供了经验证据，表明背包投票在实践中效果很好。
We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call "Knapsack Voting". We study its strategic properties - we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the $\ell_1$ distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter), and "partially" strategy-proof under general additive utilities. We extend Knapsack Voting to more general settings with revenues, deficits or surpluses, and prove a similar strategy-proofness result. To further demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we discuss its implementation on the digital voting platform that we have deployed in partnership with the local government bodies in many cities across the nation. From voting data thus collected, we present empirical evidence that Knapsack Voting works well in practice.
