论文标题
改革符合学校和大学录取的公平关注
Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions
论文作者
论文摘要
最近，世界各地的许多匹配系统已经改革。这些改革对使用的匹配机制是不公平和可操作的反对意见。令人惊讶的是，即使在改革之后，这些机制仍然不公平：新机制可能会导致一个封锁的学生渴望并值得她没有得到的学校的结果。但是，正如我们在本文中所显示的那样，改革引入了匹配机制，与反事实相比，这些机制更公平。首先，大多数改革引入了稳定性更公平的机制：每当旧机制没有阻止学生时，新机制也没有阻止学生。其次，一些改革引入了通过计数更公平的机制：旧机制始终具有与新机制一样多的阻止学生。这些发现为改革提供了一种新颖的理由，并补充了最近的文献，表明相同的改革引入了较少的操纵匹配机制。我们进一步表明，机制的公平性和可操作性在逻辑上是密切相关的。
Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after the reforms: the new mechanisms may induce an outcome with a blocking student who desires and deserves a school which she did not receive. However, as we show in this paper, the reforms introduced matching mechanisms which are more fair compared to the counterfactuals. First, most of the reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by stability: whenever the old mechanism does not have a blocking student, the new mechanism does not have a blocking student either. Second, some reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism. These findings give a novel rationale to the reforms and complement the recent literature showing that the same reforms have introduced less manipulable matching mechanisms. We further show that the fairness and manipulability of the mechanisms are strongly logically related.
