论文标题
参与性预算以累积投票
Participatory Budgeting with Cumulative Votes
论文作者
论文摘要
在参与式预算中，我们将获得一组项目 - 每个项目都有成本，可用预算以及一组以某种形式表达对项目的偏好的选民。目标是根据选民的偏好选择---总成本不超过预算的项目的子集。我们根据累积投票的想法（例如，在给出每个选民的情况下的设置）中提出了几种聚合方法，她指定了如何在项目中分配此硬币。我们根据（1）公理属性和（2）计算机模拟比较我们的聚合方法。我们确定一种方法，最小的转移对成本的转移表明了特别理想的行为。特别是，它可以显着改善现有方法，满足相称的强烈概念，因此有望在实践中使用。
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget. We propose several aggregation methods based on the idea of cumulative votes, e.g., for the setting when each voter is given one coin and she specifies how this coin should be split among the projects. We compare our aggregation methods based on (1) axiomatic properties, and (2) computer simulations. We identify one method, Minimal Transfers over Costs, that demonstrates particularly desirable behavior. In particular, it significantly improves on existing methods, satisfies a strong notion of proportionality, and, thus, is promising to be used in practice.
