论文标题
飞地意识到的隔间化并与小天狼星的安全共享
Enclave-Aware Compartmentalization and Secure Sharing with Sirius
论文作者
论文摘要
硬件辅助信任的执行环境（TEE）是许多现代应用程序的关键基础。但是，他们有一个单向隔离模型，它引入了T恤与其外界之间的语义差距。缺乏信息会导致对启用TEE的应用程序的一系列攻击，这些应用程序利用了与主机OSS，应用程序或其他飞地的各种不安全的交互。我们介绍了Sirius，这是第一个实现TEE辅助应用程序中强烈隔离并确保共享的隔间化框架，它通过控制主要内核对象中的数据流（例如线程，过程，地址空间，文件，插座，套接字，管道，管道）。 Sirius用原则上的方法替代了当前发球台系统中的临时相互作用，从而增加了强烈的地点间和地址内空间隔离，并有效地消除了广泛的攻击。我们在ARM平台上评估Sirius，发现它很轻（$ \ $ 15K $ loc），并且仅添加$ \ \ \％$ $开销，以在HTTPD等应用程序上启用T恤支持，并改善了现有的TEE应用程序的性能，例如Darknet ML ML ML Framework和Arm的Libdsecs和$ 0.05 \％。
Hardware-assisted trusted execution environments (TEEs) are critical building blocks of many modern applications. However, they have a one-way isolation model that introduces a semantic gap between a TEE and its outside world. This lack of information causes an ever-increasing set of attacks on TEE-enabled applications that exploit various insecure interactions with the host OSs, applications, or other enclaves. We introduce Sirius, the first compartmentalization framework that achieves strong isolation and secure sharing in TEE-assisted applications by controlling the dataflows within primary kernel objects (e.g. threads, processes, address spaces, files, sockets, pipes) in both the secure and normal worlds. Sirius replaces ad-hoc interactions in current TEE systems with a principled approach that adds strong inter- and intra-address space isolation and effectively eliminates a wide range of attacks. We evaluate Sirius on ARM platforms and find that it is lightweight ($\approx 15K$ LoC) and only adds $\approx 10.8\%$ overhead to enable TEE support on applications such as httpd, and improves the performance of existing TEE-enabled applications such as the Darknet ML framework and ARM's LibDDSSec by $0.05\%-5.6\%$.
