论文标题
与附加实用程序的比例参与预算
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究参与性预算的投票规则，其中一组选民共同决定应使用共同预算资助哪些项目。我们允许项目有任意费用，选民可以对项目进行任意添加估值。我们制定一个公理（扩展的合理代表，EJR），以保证与具有共同利益的选民群体比例代表。我们提出了一项简单而有吸引力的投票规则，称为“平等股份”方法，该方法满足了任意成本和批准公用事业的公理，并满足了一个公理，最多可用于一个任意添加剂估值的项目。可以在多项式时间内计算此方法。相比之下，我们表明，在委员会选举，比例批准投票（PAV）中实现比例性的标准方法不能扩展到任意费用。最后，我们引入了加强的公理（完全合理的代表，FJR），并表明它也令人满意，尽管计算上更昂贵且自然的投票规则较低。
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive valuations over the projects. We formulate an axiom (Extended Justified Representation, EJR) that guarantees proportional representation to groups of voters with common interests. We propose a simple and attractive voting rule called the Method of Equal Shares that satisfies this axiom for arbitrary costs and approval utilities, and that satisfies the axiom up to one project for arbitrary additive valuations. This method can be computed in polynomial time. In contrast, we show that the standard method for achieving proportionality in committee elections, Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), cannot be extended to work with arbitrary costs. Finally, we introduce a strengthened axiom (Full Justified Representation, FJR) and show that it is also satisfiable, though by a computationally more expensive and less natural voting rule.
