论文标题
战略论证中的腐败和审计
Corruption and Audit in Strategic Argumentation
论文作者
论文摘要
战略论证提供了一种简单的代理人争论和谈判模型。尽管可能预计代理人会为我们的最大利益行事，但几乎没有实施这种行为。 （Maher，2016年）在战略论证中引入了腐败和抵抗腐败的模型。在本文中，我们确定了该公式中未检测到的腐败行为。我们加强了检测这种行为的模型，并表明，在加强模型下，所有战略目标（Maher，2016年）都对腐败具有抵抗力。
Strategic argumentation provides a simple model of disputation and negotiation among agents. Although agents might be expected to act in our best interests, there is little that enforces such behaviour. (Maher, 2016) introduced a model of corruption and resistance to corruption within strategic argumentation. In this paper we identify corrupt behaviours that are not detected in that formulation. We strengthen the model to detect such behaviours, and show that, under the strengthened model, all the strategic aims in (Maher, 2016) are resistant to corruption.
